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Political dynamics limit the effectiveness of many environmental governance regimes, 
including the UNESCO World Heritage regime. We provide new evidence on how 
multiscale political dynamics mediate ecosystem interventions to produce a range of 
outcomes. We use the World Heritage In Danger system as a model system through which 
to explore the evolution of UNESCO interventions, counterproductive national responses 
to interventions, and ways of arresting counterproductive responses. Our findings inform 
how we can better anticipate and account for political dynamics in designing, 
implementing, and evaluating environmental governance. 
 
Iconic ecosystems, such as the Galapagos Islands, the Three Parallel Rivers of Yunnan, and 
the Great Barrier Reef, are ecosystems of outstanding socio-economic, environmental and 
cultural value. Many of these high value ecosystems are protected or placed on ‘in danger’ lists 
to ensure their current and future conservation and use. Because of the substantial investment 
that international protection requires, it is reasonable to expect more effective conservation of 
those ecosystems than other ecosystems. Yet complex threats are causing many of these iconic 
ecosystems to diminish, in both function and extent 1-4.  Take the case of the Great Barrier Reef, 
for example, an ecosystem that successive Australian governments continue to shield from 




Here, we report the findings of a global longitudinal study of the UNESCO World Heritage In 
Danger system 6-8. We show the underestimation of threatened ecosystems, and document how 
hidden political dynamics cause some governments to preference rhetorical adoption, passive 
resistance or appropriation over compliance or negotiation with UNESCO. In studying these 
relationships, our primary purpose is to explain hidden political dynamics, and to use this 
systematic understanding to identify a broader set of solutions for enhancing sustainability 
governance. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to assess how the World Heritage (WH) 
system is addressing ecosystem governance threats across multiple scales and time. 
 
Governance threats are the threats to World Heritage sites that stem from multiscale political 
dynamics (such as industrial lobbying) and generate counterproductive site protection. There 
is widespread agreement that lobbying and ‘politicization’ limit the effectiveness of 
environmental governance regimes, including the World Heritage (WH) system 7-11. At the 
local scale, expertise in managing such political dynamics has risen sharply over the last few 
decades 12. We now understand how disputes about natural resource extraction can be resolved, 
for example, through deliberation, local rules and incentives 13-15. Informational strategies such 
as environmental reporting and eco-certification can also assist in depoliticizing local 
ecosystem conflict 16,17. Yet the strategic politics of iconic ecosystem governance at higher 
scales is barely understood. Indeed, UNESCO’s own management-focused threat reporting 
tends to either overlook governance threats altogether or smooth them away according to broad 
stereotypes about poor governance in developing economies. More research is needed to 
determine exactly what governance threats are, how political dynamics mediate government 
responses to international intervention in iconic ecosystems, and further what to do about it 
18,19.  
 
International relations theory suggests, for example, that governments often avoid strategies of 
negotiation and compliance with international directives, in favor of alternative strategies such 
as manipulation and resistance20,21. Such strategies can reflect a conflict in priorities between 
a principal (an international organisation) and an agent (a national government) (this is known 
as the principal-agent problem) 22. Socio-ecological systems theory suggests that political and 
socioecological dynamics can interact to produce atypical responses, surprise, and 
uncontrollability 23,24. Such outcomes are problematic because they can tip an ecosystem into 
a new political and ecological state from which it is very difficult to return (this is known as 
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‘hysteresis’) 25.  However, beyond local snapshot studies of individual ecosystems, these 
insights are yet to inform our understanding of ecosystem governance 26,27. 
 
Addressing these gaps and improving governance requires empirical evidence of how political 
dynamics play out across ecosystems and at multiple scales and over time. We used the 
UNESCO system as a model system through which to explore the multiscale politics of iconic 
ecosystem governance. Our central goal was to understand how “in danger” designations (or 
lack thereof) shape and are shaped by longitudinal relations between national governments and 
UNESCO, and the implications for ecosystem governance and outcomes. In Danger listing is 
not a top-down and static process; rather it is a relational and fluid exercise, occurring over 
many years 28.  Formal deliberations occur at annual World Heritage meetings, based on 
information received from national governments, the International Union for the Conservation 
of Nature, UNESCO’s own reactive monitoring missions and NGO petitions 29. While we 
acknowledge heterogeneities and competing interests within and among such actors 30,31, we 
focused on the relationships between UNESCO and the 102 national governments ultimately 
responsible for implementing ecosystem protection under the WH Convention. We combined 
In Danger certification patterns, site threat records and UNESCO deliberation frequencies for 
238 sites between 1972 and 2019 to develop a more advanced system of site certification than 
UNESCO’s own system. We then undertook extensive quantitative and qualitative process-
tracing through document analysis (n=3099) and country-level analysis (n=102) to understand 
how “in danger” designations (or lack thereof) shape longitudinal relations between national 
governments and UNESCO, and the implications for ecosystem governance. Confidential 
interviews (n=32) enabled verification of system-wide results and extraction of site-specific 
examples (see Methods and Supplementary Fig S1). 
 
Inconsistent use of In Danger listings  
 
Examination of the use of the WH In Danger List since its inception in 1983 reveals 
inconsistent use, including a 31.6% decline In Danger listings between 2001-2008 (Fig. 1). 
Interviewees attributed this period of decline to “increased politicization” of the process (e.g. 
Interview WH01, also WH07, WH10). In the subsequent period (2009-2017), In Danger 
listings returned to previous levels, coinciding with, and perhaps because of, increased 
oversight by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN). Indeed, the IUCN 
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advanced its own World Heritage Outlook assessment in 2011 with the stated goals of 
improving the independence and transparency of WHC decisions 32,33.   
 
By 2019, only 16 out of 238 sites were certified on the World Heritage In Danger list, with a 
total of 30 sites certified at least once in the 1972-2019 period. However, a key finding from 
our analysis is that there are 41 sites that have never been certified as In Danger but which have 
reported threats equal to or higher in intensity than those certified as In Danger (threat intensity 
>=23.2) (Fig. 2). This is a new status of site – which we classify as “Technically In Danger” – 
a status that is currently unrecognized by UNESCO. Of these 41 Technically in Danger sites, 
27 have been proposed for an In Danger listing more than once by the World Heritage 
Committee (WHC), but have never made it onto the In Danger list. For many of these sites, 
document analysis confirms divergence between WHC Advisory Body recommendations and 
subsequent WHC decisions, and inconsistencies between the WHC and formal World Heritage 
Advisory Body classifications, such as IUCN classifications. Our identification of Technically 
in Danger sites also corresponds with a clear plateauing of net In Danger listings from 2000 
onwards, which is in stark contrast to the steady growth of net inscription of new World 










Fig. 2. Unrecognized extent of threats (in orange) for natural World Heritage sites. 
 
Atypical responses to In Danger listings 
 
How do we explain the persistence of Technically In Danger ecosystems over time? Why do 
sites that are just as threatened or more threatened than those certified as In Danger continue 
to evade the In Danger list?  A key finding is that the threat of an ‘In Danger’ listing by 
UNESCO drives a range of responses by governments over time.  While individual 
governments can and do change their responses over time, we found that analysing responses 
according to similar threat status, UNESCO intervention characteristics and national response 
characteristics enabled development of a generalised spectrum of responses (see Methods). At 
one end of the spectrum, we found sites that had either never been listed as In Danger, or had 
been listed at least once as In Danger, with government responses characterised by compliance, 
negotiation, or appropriation. At the other end, we found sites that were Technically in Danger, 
with government responses that can be best described as rhetorical and resistant to WH 
intervention (Fig. 3).  
 
Compliance, for example, is associated with full acceptance of World Heritage values, with 
complying sites never certified as In Danger nor proposed for an In Danger listing, and 
governance characterized by transparent and regular reporting (56% of sites e.g. Ilulissat 
Icefjord, Denmark).  Negotiation responses, by contrast, are associated with at least one In 
Danger listing and significant dialogue with UNESCO (17% of sites e.g. Galápagos Islands, 
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Ecuador; Tropical Rainforest Heritage of Sumatra, Indonesia; East Rennell, Solomon Islands; 
Manas Wildlife Sanctuary, India). Appropriation, on the other hand, occurs in the rare 
situation when the responsible government exploits an In Danger listing for its own internal 
purposes, such as to generate votes or wield power over local actors (1% of sites e.g. 
Everglades, USA; Yellowstone USA) (Fig. 3).  
 
At the Technically in Danger end of the spectrum (26% of sites), most sites were characterised 
by rhetorical adoption responses. Rhetorical adoption occurs when governments exert their 
autonomy in an oppositional manner (through partial compliance and symbolic commitments) 
to repeated In Danger proposals and high threats (above certified In Danger levels) in order to 
keep a site off the In Danger list. Rhetorical adoption characterises 21% of all sites, including 
the Great Barrier Reef, Australia; the Three Parallel Rivers of Yunnan Protected Areas, China; 
and the Western Caucasus, Russia. Australia, for instance, avoided an In Danger listing for the 
Great Barrier Reef in 2015 by developing a long-term sustainability plan in 2016; however, the 
method of financing and implementing the plan was characteristic of rhetorical adoption rather 
than a clear display of compliance. For example, in 2018, an Australian national audit and 
Senate inquiry found that a significant portion of finance for the plan was delivered in a non-
compliant (non-competitive and non-transparent) process to a private organisation with limited 
capacity and expertise, thereby jeopardising the ability to achieve the key actions and outcomes 
set out in the agreed plan 34-36 (Fig 3., Supplementary Table S1).  
 
Passive resistance (5% of sites), by contrast, occurs when threats are high but the site attracts 
limited attention and effort from both the responsible government and UNESCO. Seven sites 
fall into this category, including geographically remote sites such as Tubbataha Reefs 
(Philippines) and Henderson Island (United Kingdom) as well as institutionally complex sites, 
including Banc d'Arguin (Mauritania), Mount Athos (Greece), Halong Bay (Vietnam), 





Fig. 3. | Governance of World Heritage listed ecosystems is a function of UNESCO intervention and 
national response. Most studies of World Heritage governance focus on interventions in proximate socio-
environmental threats generating compliance and negotiation responses (top of diagram).  A critical challenge in 
empirical approaches is to internalize how political threats mediate such interventions to generate alternate 
responses and less controllable governance outcomes (bottom of diagram). 
 
Counterproductive governance outcomes  
 
Do different responses to UNESCO intervention result in different environmental governance 
outcomes? Scientists and policymakers tend to hope that UNESCO interventions will result in 
either a predictable or a controllable ecosystem governance outcome. Here, however, we show 
that different types of responses generate different ecosystem governance outcomes, ranging 
from predictable at one end of the spectrum to uncontrollable and invisible at the other (Fig. 
3). 
 
Predictable relationships, for example, occur when an intervention (e.g. inscription of a 
location on the World Heritage list) results in the expected improvement in site governance 
(such as a compliance response characterised by positive certification and regular shared 
monitoring and reporting). The Danish government, for example, has consistently improved 
management of Greenland’s Ilulissat Icefjord since inscription in 2004, including a 2018 
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management plan that explicitly acknowledges the effects of climate change on the glacier 
(Supplementary Table S1).  
 
Likewise, controllable relationships occur when improved governance is dependent on periodic 
pulses of interventions (such as a negotiation response characterised by negative certification 
and/or technical and financial assistance). Many negotiating governments receive technical and 
financial assistance to assist them in moving towards compliance - this pathway is one of the 
stated intentions of the In Danger listing, and a strategic action by some governments. The 
Ecuador government, for example, has received repeated technical and financial assistance and 
an In Danger listing to assist in moving the Galápagos system toward compliance 
(Supplementary Table S1).   
 
When site governance is immune to conventional interventions, such as certification and 
technical or financial assistance, the relationship is only potentially controllable. The USA 
government, for example, has alternately rejected or appropriated intervention in the 
Everglades2 system in direct correlation with national political sentiment, resulting in a 
continuous cycle of multiple policy reversals. Under both the Clinton and Obama (Democrat) 
administrations, for example, the USA government requested that UNESCO certify the 
Everglades2 as In Danger, in order to wield power over lower levels of government, other 
federal agencies, and private actors. Under the second Bush administration, by contrast, the 
USA government requested that UNESCO remove the site from the In Danger List, despite 
advisory board recommendations and stakeholder criticism (Supplementary Table S1).  
 
When site governance is not only robust to conventional intervention strategies but also subject 
to rhetorical adoption, the relationship becomes even less controllable. The Australian 
Government, for example, has implemented symbolic and partially compliant policies to avoid 
an In Danger listing for the Great Barrier Reef 34,35,37, locking-in a new political and ecological 
state for the reef that concerned stakeholders have found difficult to penetrate (Supplementary 
Table S1). 
 
Finally, invisible relationships occur when site governance is passive in the face of 
intervention, although we know little as to why. To understand the Ha Long Bay system, for 
example, additional research strategies would need to uncover drivers such as poverty levels, 
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World Bank intervention, proximity to China, and cultural resistance to intervention, amongst 
others38 (Supplementary Table S1). 
 
These different ecosystem governance outcomes are important because they have a material 
impact on the ground in WH sites. In the case of the Great Barrier Reef, for example, the lack 
of an In Danger listing has made it much easier for harmful developments on or adjacent to the 
Reef to be approved, and much easier for the Australian government to convince the public of 
the necessity to wind back national climate commitments5. As a consequence, the 2019 Great 
Barrier Reef Outlook Report assessed the overall outlook for the Reef as ‘very poor,’ and in 
2020, the Great Barrier Reef bleached again for the third time in five years, generating grave 
concerns about the ecosystem’s future ability to recover before yet another bleaching event.  
 
High natural resource dependency drives rhetorical responses 
 
Addressing counterproductive responses, such as appropriation, rhetoric and resistance, is a 
wicked governance challenge 39. UNESCO’s own reporting system does not explain this 
spectrum of responses. Indeed, UNESCO’s reporting system only reports ‘governance’ threats 
when they relate to developing and emerging economies (Fig. 4).  
 
Whether a nation’s economy is developed, emerging or developing also does not solely explain 
this spectrum of responses. We must look to broader drivers, such as wealth, governance 
quality, economic complexity, and natural resource dependence, to uncover the reasons behind 
different responses (Fig 5). We use GDP as a proxy for wealth 40. By governance quality, we 
refer to control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism, regulatory quality, rule of law, and voice and accountability41. By economic 
complexity, we mean the diversified capability of a nation’s economy42. By natural resource 
dependency, we refer to the dependency of a country’s exports and services on primary 
resources (such as agriculture, forestry, mining and environmental tourism) 43-48.  
 
As broad stereotyping of governance in developed vs. developing economies would suggest, 
WH sites characterized by compliance and appropriation responses are often located in 
advanced economies (45% for compliance, 100% for appropriation) with limited dependence 
on natural resources and high GDP, governance quality, and economic complexity. Sites 
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characterized by negotiation responses, by contrast, are primarily located in developing 
economies (84%) with lower values in all social and political indices, such as GDP per capita 
and governance quality. Negotiation responses also correlate with lower economic complexity 
and higher levels of dependence on natural resource industries (e.g. mining, forestry, and 
environmental tourism) (Fig. 5). These results reflect common stereotypes about the relative 
challenges of achieving ecosystem sustainability in developed vs. developing economies.  
 
However, we also found results that challenge such stereotypes. WH sites characterized by 
rhetorical adoption responses, for example, include many in the advanced (23% e.g. Australia) 
and emerging (45% e.g. China, Russia) economies (Fig. 6). These economies exhibit high 
levels of GDP and natural resource dependence, but lower levels of economic complexity and 
governance relative to economies with compliance responses (Fig. 5). In these economies, high 
levels of GDP and natural resource dependence are mutually reinforcing, reflecting the sheer 
power of industrial-scale resource development over efforts to sustainably govern protected 
areas 1,2. Put simply, when an economy is dependent on limited high-value natural resource 
industries, our analysis suggests that governments will preference rhetorical adoption over 




Fig. 4. Governance threats overlooked in UNESCO’s own reporting. Only 6% of 238 natural WH sites have 
ever had ‘governance’ declared as a threat by UNESCO, with a strong bias toward developing economies (7 
sites) and emerging economies (7 sites), rather than developed economies (0 sites). Most reporting is focused on 
local “management” threats rather than governance threats at other scales (World Heritage reporting across 







Fig. 5.  National responses according to economic complexity and natural resource dependency. MIT 
economic complexity levels (left, average +/- standard error) and World Bank natural resources dependency (right, 
international tourism receipts, agricultural raw material exports, fuel exports and ores and metal exports, as a 
percentage of total exports) 43-49. 
 
 
Fig. 6.  National responses according to economy type. IMF economic development categories 50.  
 
The problem of regulatory capture 
 
Why does high natural resource dependency cause governments to favour rhetorical adoption 
over straightforward negotiation or compliance? In sites characterized by rhetorical adoption, 
we found that the influence of natural resource industries extends far beyond their local 
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environmental footprint. Interviewees confirmed that coalitions of industry actors, “some of 
whom are more powerful than individual nation-states,” are capable of having a significant 
political impact on a government’s stance on World Heritage, and have become a prime 
motivator in both seeking World Heritage status and keeping threatened sites off the In Danger 
list (Interviews WH01, WH07, WH10, WH14).  
 
Industry coalitions often lobby governments, UNESCO and WHC member countries, claiming 
that an In Danger listing diminishes a nation’s international reputation and restricts foreign 
investment, national productivity, local employment, and industrial license to operate. For 
example, powerful coalitions of industry actors have sought to challenge the World Heritage 
system and undermine reports by scientists, NGOs, and the media. These efforts have 
heightened a government’s sense of political threat by linking In Danger listings to national 
economic performance and to the individual reputations of politicians and senior bureaucrats 
(Interview WH14). 
 
Governments have responded to these pressures by prioritising management of reputational 
threat (e.g. through diplomatic pressure on WHC member countries and partial compliance) 
over environmental threat (e.g. Interview WH14). Because such responses reflect regulatory 
capture of governments by powerful industry interests 51,52, interviewees confirmed that 
politicians and bureaucrats often work to conceal these dynamics, rendering the governance 
outcome both unpredictable and uncontrollable. At the same time, UNESCO itself is acutely 
aware of these dynamics and concerned about threats to its own reputation (Interview WH01).   
In these circumstances, interviewees stated that the usefulness of the List of World Heritage in 
Danger as a policy tool is diminishing, because “the energy of the Convention and the 
responsible governments is spent in a way that does not improve the protection of WH areas” 
(Interview WH01).  
 
Challenges for World Heritage 
 
The World Heritage case shows that interventions that have proven effective in developing 
economies (such as local science-based improvements in management capacity and resources) 
are less adequate in advanced and emerging economies characterized by high natural resource 
dependence. In many instances, distal political threats such as reputational risk mediate how 
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governments respond to local socio-environmental threat. Indeed, managing political threats 
(such as reputational risk) now forms the pervasive logic of some governments, especially in 
the advanced and emerging economies. This phenomenon parallels a global trend whereby 
managing reputational threat is now the dominant concern of many large organisations 53. In 
these cases, conventional interventions are failing to address the degradation of the world’s 
iconic ecosystems. The WH system is locked in a governance trap, whereby the ability to arrest 
degradation is constrained by both a misdiagnosis of the nature of the problem and the 
unpredictable and uncertain behavior of the actors responsible for its solution 37. 
 
Harnessing governance threats to improve environmental governance 
 
While World Heritage is an important but very small part of the environmental estate, the 
evidence here is sufficient for scientists, NGOS and policymakers to develop an ‘immune 
system’ of countervailing power against industrial lobbying and regulatory capture in all 
environmental governance. Indeed, a number of emergent developments in the World Heritage 
system demonstrate that it is possible to “harness” such governance threats, that is, to use the 
power of governance threats to produce a new kind of power. For example, a nascent 
international network known as World Heritage Watch has mobilised to form a competing 
coalition and push for similar standing to the World Heritage Centre and the formal Advisory 
Bodies. New availability of GIS imagery and online reporting is beginning to usher in an era 
of greater transparency and accountability, revealing alternative compliance and conflicts of 
interest. PADDDtracker.org, for example, is an online, crowd-sourced mapping tool for 
measuring and disseminating data on protected areas that are being dismantled 54.  In 2019, the 
World Wide Fund for Nature released a report recommending a strategic reframing of the 
World Heritage Convention and tactical changes to its structures and processes. And, in 
February 2020, a consortium of 76 organizations and individuals petitioned UNESCO to 
address national climate action in World Heritage decision making.  
However, long-held assumptions and knowledge gaps in environmental governance remain. 
Prevailing beliefs about poorer governance in developing economies, for example, must be 
rejected in the face of the powerful influence of industry elites in advanced and emerging 
economies. Additional research is required to understand how intervention strategies can be 
designed to target higher-level elites (such as politicians, senior bureaucrats, and business 
elites), rather than environmental ministries, local resource managers, scientists, and 
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environmental groups (who are often the least powerful within their own country, but the 
typical target of ecosystem interventions55).  
In this regard, recent findings on international peacekeeping intervention in resistant 
states21,56,57 could be usefully extended to efforts to improve environmental governance. It is 
possible, for instance, to redirect the national balance of power away from industry lobbyists 
through supporting broader good governance and compliance. Strategic reframing37 can be 
used to highlight mutual interests to this broad polity, such as economic resilience and resource 
security. Reframing can also be used to exploit key fractures, such as internal corruption, and 
to focus blame, for example, by highlighting how resource dependency increases risk of 
economic and political capture at regional and national levels (Fig 3.). Further study of the role 
of transparency mechanisms, government audits, inquiries and commissions, independent 




Ecosystems are under threat. International science-based interventions, such as protected are 
designation and monitoring, are typically upheld as the solution. Our analysis illuminates the 
underestimation of the threats, and documents how the traditional powers of the nation-state 
and rational science continue to struggle to arrest those threats. In the case of World Heritage, 
hidden governance threats explain why some governments preference rhetorical adoption, 
passive resistance or appropriation over compliance or negotiation.  
Against this backdrop, ongoing debates over better engagement of civil society, a Code of 
Conduct for State Parties, improved certification of individual sites and a mechanism for 
national climate accountability, are all setting the agenda for UNESCO World Heritage. These 
developments are still in their infancy, and many of them require a fundamental reorganization 
of the national and international political economy if they are to succeed. We do not fully 
understand the potentials and limitations of these developments as a means of improving the 
outlook for WH ecosystems. However, their unifying characteristic is that they provide 
important insight into how all environment actors can better apprehend and indeed harness 
political dynamics to produce a more productive form of governance.  
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As human pressures on the environment accelerate, it is critical to strengthen – not weaken –
governance across the entire environmental estate. The Australian government’s 2019 rhetoric 
on segregating climate change from World Heritage intervention could embolden other 
countries to embrace a similar race to the bottom. Given the global investment in environmental 
governance over the last fifty years, it is essential to accelerate research and support evidence-












We investigated the assumption that the standard mix of World Heritage interventions (namely 
‘in danger’ certification, financial assistance, co-developed management plans, and ongoing 
threat monitoring) will effectively arrest ecosystem degradation. We approached the problem 
of ecosystem intervention by focusing on how political-economic dynamics shape and are 
shaped by UNESCO intervention and national response across multiple scales and contexts.  
 
Global Database of World Heritage. We compiled a database of 238 UNESCO World 
Heritage (WH) Areas certified for their natural or mixed (natural and cultural) significance 
across 102 nation-states and spanning the period 1972-2019 (Supplementary ref. 1-2). The 
interactions for those individual sites and the WH system as a whole were first studied by 
analysing quantitative patterns of threat reporting and In Danger certification, and then 
undertaking extensive process-tracing through document analysis, key informant interviews, 
and country-level analysis to understand specific governance responses. Based on the threat 
and In Danger analysis, we developed a global analysis of the unrecognised extent of World 
Heritage sites in danger. Documentary analysis, stratified key-informant interviews, and 
country-level correlation enabled development of a model of national responses to In Danger 
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listings. We then assessed different types of responses to reveal different types of outcomes. 
This process enabled the preliminary theory and typology of iconic ecosystem governance 
developed from the literature, to be expanded and verified (Supplementary Fig. S1). The study 
is a mixed-methods study combining in-depth interview data (qualitative) with global site 
threat data (quantitative), data from UNESCO and governmental records (qualitative and 
quantitative), and economic and governance data (quantitative). We combined new interview 
data with new analysis and combination of existing raw data (quantitative and qualitative) from 
UNESCO, individual governments, the World Bank, the IMF, and the MIT Economic 
Complexity Index. We achieved validity and reliability through multiple sources of evidence, 
inter-coder checks, process-tracing, and comparative analysis. 
 
Ecosystem Threat and In Danger Analysis. Initial analysis was undertaken of the different 
types of threats reported and the frequency of different types of threats for individual sites 
(n=238) and across the whole WH system. Threats included both primary threats (n=14) and 
secondary threats (n=65). The Threat Intensity (TI) value is a quantitative measure of the 
frequency of UNESCO World Heritage Committee deliberations on threats to individual sites 
(Supplementary ref. 2). We averaged the TI to determine sites that UNESCO has never certified 
as In Danger, but which have a TI value equal or higher to the lowest TI value of the In Danger 
sites (Supplementary Fig S1). This revealed an additional 41 sites that have never been certified 
as In Danger but which have had an average TI value equal or higher to this threshold 
(TI>=23.2 since inscription, n=41). We termed this new category ‘Technically in Danger’ – an 
entirely new category we devised to distinguish those sites from sites that have either never 
been In Danger or have been both technically and formally In Danger at least once (which we 
termed ‘Never in Danger’ and ‘In Danger’) (Fig. 2). We also used the advanced word search 
function to interrogate the entire dataset to confirm that all other sites with a TI lower than this 
threshold could be categorized as Never In Danger. We then triangulated our results with 
changing patterns of threat reporting and In Danger listing over time, as discussed below (Fig. 
1, Fig. 2).  
 
Quantitative National Economic and Good Governance Correlation. We interrogated 
national economic and good governance variables because national governments are directly 
responsible for implementing ecosystem protection at the site level under the Convention. 
Quantitative country level data for the 238 sites (102 countries) was correlated with our new 3 
categories of site (Never In Danger, In Danger, and Technically In Danger) (Supplementary 
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Fig. S2). IMF (International Monetary Fund) categories were used to class each national 
economy as advanced, emerging or developing (Supplementary Fig. S2) (Supplementary ref. 
3). WorldBank data on GDP per capita (ppp current international $) and good governance 
(including (1) control of corruption, (2) government effectiveness, (3) political stability and 
absence of violence/terrorism, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of law, (6) voice and 
accountability) were correlated with the 3 new categories of site (Supplementary ref. 4-5) 
(Supplementary Fig. S2).  
Quantitative and Qualitative Process Tracing. Process-tracing was undertaken through a 
content analysis of all Advisory Body Evaluations (n = 661), WH Decision Reports (n = 92), 
WH Mission Reports (n = 210), WH Periodic Reports (n = 533), WH State of Conservation 
Reports (n = 1,390), and State Party (Government) Conservation Reports (n = 213) pertaining 
to individual sites 1972-2019. Some of these documents required translation from French into 
English. The overall case spanned 238 sites; however, the focused analysis was restricted to 
the use of WH In Danger listing (potential/proposed/actual) for 148 sites inscribed on the 
World Heritage List for more than 10 years. We excluded 90 sites as they either spanned 
multiple countries (n=15), were too recently inscribed (since 2007) (n=52), or did not have 
sufficient reporting to be properly assessed (n=62) (Supplementary Fig. S1). We coded the 
remaining 148 sites according to five types of responses to a proposed or realised In Danger 
listing (Fig. 3, Supplementary Table S2). Sites that demonstrated regular shared monitoring 
and reporting and full compliance with shared WH norms were coded as “compliance”. Sites 
that demonstrated ongoing dialogue and extra technical and financial UNESCO assistance 
toward co-developed management plans were coded as “negotiation”. Sites that engaged in 
voluntary requests for In Danger listing and removal were coded as “appropriation”. Sites that 
opposed and avoided proposed In Danger listings through partial compliance and symbolic 
commitments were coded as “rhetorical adoption”. Sites that demonstrated low visibility to 
UNESCO or indifference by the responsible government despite reported threats above listed 
In Danger levels were coded as “passive resistance” (Fig. 3). 
To supplement qualitative analysis of the nature of interactions between the World Heritage 
Committee and individual governments over time, we extracted quantitative and qualitative 
data on site-level and system-level use of In Danger listing (nonuse, proposed, enacted, or 
removed) and financial and technical assistance provided to individual sites over time. This 
data enabled process-tracing and validation of the changing usage of reporting, external 
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assistance, and In Danger listing 1972-2017 (Supplementary Fig. S1, Supplementary Table 
S1). To ensure inter-coder reliability, two coders also independently cross-checked a 
subsample of the data. See Supplementary Tables S1 and S2 for a detailed catalog of different 
types of national responses alongside a subsample of 5 representative cases. 
Quantitative National Economic Complexity and Resource Dependency Correlation.  
We interrogated national economic and resource dependency variables because national 
governments are directly responsible for implementing ecosystem protection at the site level 
under the Convention. Quantitative country level data for the 148 sites (70 countries) was 
correlated with the 5 categories of national response (Compliance, Negotiation, Appropriation, 
Rhetorical Adoption and Passive Resistance). Natural resources dependency was calculated as 
the sum of international tourism receipts, agricultural raw material exports, fuel exports and 
ores and metal exports, as a percentage of total exports (Fig. 5) (Supplementary ref. 6-11). We 
used the MIT Economic Complexity Index (ECI) (38) to understand the knowledge intensity 
of a country’s economy and primary resource dependency of a country’s exports (Fig. 5) 
(Supplementary ref. 12).  
 
Stratified and Key-Informant Interviews and External Document Verification. 
Confidential interviews (n=32) were held with World Heritage experts from the World 
Heritage Committee, the Advisory Bodies, site management authorities, international and 
national ENGOs, national and provincial government agencies, international and national 
industry bodies, and research institutes. Because it was not possible to collect data from all key 
informants, we stratified the sample to ensure representation of most types of actors. 8 different 
strata were delineated, involving different combinations of WH actors experienced with 
environmental, political, or economic issues at regional, state, national, and international levels. 
3 people were interviewed across each category. To triangulate further, in-depth interviews 
were held with 8 key-informants. Interviews occurred over a 12-mo period during 2018 and 
lasted 60–90 min each. We conducted interviews in person and by Skype. The interview 
questions were semi structured and focused on the governance of WH over time; how WH 
governance differs according to socio-environmental and political threats, and the variety of 
responses to an In Danger listing. Interviews were confidential in accordance with James Cook 
University ethics approval no. H6149. To check saturation and avoid recall bias, we compared 
the results against each other and against other sources of evidence, such as independent NGO 





Findings are derived from the following primary and secondary data sources: in-depth, 
confidential stratified and key-informant interviews (n = 32 interviews), threat and certification 
data for natural World Heritage sites (n=238 sites), documentary analysis (n = 3099 
documents); and economic and governance data (n = 102 countries) (Supplementary Fig. S1). 
The data that support the findings of this study (excluding confidential interviews) are available 
from the corresponding author upon request. Interview results are confidential in accordance 
with James Cook University ethics approval no. H6149. A detailed explanation of methods is 
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Supplementary Fig. S2.  Economic and governance settings for Never in Danger, Technically In Danger 
and In Danger sites. (a. IMF categories of country development; b. WorldBank GDP per capita ppp (in current 



































Type and Example of National Response to UNESCO Intervention 
              Compliance: Ilulissat Icefjord, Denmark 
2004 Inscription on World Heritage (WH) list, World Heritage Committee (WHC) requests review of ecosystem protection and 
management.  
2007 State of Conservation (SOC) Report -WHC commends Danish government for reviewing ecosystem protection and developing 
revised management and monitoring plan. 




Periodic Report submitted – Outstanding Universal Value (OUV) being impacted by increased tourism and climate change but 
effective management in place. 
Retrospective statement of OUV adopted. 
2018 Management Plan 2018 – 2020 released.  
 
              Negotiation: Galápagos Islands, Ecuador 
1978 Inscription on WH list. 
1979 Technical and Financial Assistance, WHC commits USD $62,000 for training and equipment. 
1982 Financial Assistance, WHC commits USD $10,000 for training. 
1985  SOC Report and Financial Assistance, WHC commits USD $19,000 for equipment and training. 
1986  SOC Report and Financial Assistance, WHC commits USD $20,000 for environmental education program. 
1987 Financial Assistance, WHC commits USD $19,500 for technical advice and planning. 
1988 Financial Assistance, WHC commits USD $58,250 for training and equipment. 
1989  Financial Assistance, WHC commits USD $83,500 for training, equipment and planning. 
1990  SOC Report and Financial Assistance, WHC commits USD $16,000 for training and tourism study. 
1992 SOC Report and Financial Assistance, WHC commits USD $67,100 for training and revision of management plan. 
1994 SOC Report and Financial Assistance, WHC commits USD $50,000 for equipment. 
1995  SOC Report noting multiple threats: Financial resources; Fishing/collecting aquatic resources; Impacts of tourism / visitor / 
recreation; Invasive / alien marine species; Invasive/alien terrestrial species; Legal framework; and Management systems/ 
management plan. 
1996  SOC Report and Mission Report - WHC proposes to list Galapagos as In Danger, which is opposed by Ecuadorian government. 
1997  SOC Report - WHC decide not to inscribe on In Danger List. 
1998 SOC Report and Financial Assistance, WHC commits USD $112,500 in assistance for ecological monitoring. 
2000  SOC Report notes similar multiple threats to 1995, however notes that the need for a special law has now been resolved. 
2001 SOC Report and Financial Assistance, WHC commits USD $50,000 in emergency assistance. 
2002 SOC Report notes similar multiple threats to 2000, however notes the additional threat of illegal activities.  
2003  SOC Report and Mission Report. 
2004  SOC Report noting multiple continued and new threats:  Financial resources; Fishing/collecting aquatic resources; Impacts of 
tourism / visitor / recreation; Invasive/alien terrestrial species; Legal framework; Weaknesses in quarantine measures; and 
Passage of international and national marine traffic. 
2005  SOC Report noting multiple continued and new threats:  Illegal activities; Legal framework; Management activities; and 
Implementation of quarantine measures 
2006 SOC Report and Mission Report. SOC report noting multiple continued and new threats:  Governance; Human resources; Identity, 
social cohesion, changes in local population and community; Illegal activities; Invasive/alien terrestrial species; Management 
activities; and Management systems/ management plan. Ecuadorian government opposes proposal to In Danger List. 
2007  SOC Report and Mission Report. SOC report noting multiple continued and new threats:  Governance; Human resources; Identity, 
social cohesion, changes in local population and community; Illegal activities; Impacts of tourism / visitor / recreation; 
Management activities; and Educational reform not implemented. Despite previous opposition by Ecuadorian government, all 
parties agree that Galapagos is added to In Danger List. 
2008 SOC Report noting multiple continued and new threats:  Governance; Human resources; Identity, social cohesion, changes in local 
population and community; Illegal activities; Impacts of tourism / visitor / recreation; Major visitor accommodation and 
associated infrastructure; Management activities; Management systems/ management plan; and Educational reform not 
implemented. 
2009 SOC Report notes the same threats as 2008. 
2010 SOC Report and Mission Report. SOC report noting multiple continued and new threats:  Fishing/collecting aquatic resources; 
Governance; Identity, social cohesion, changes in local population and community; Illegal activities; Impacts of tourism / visitor / 
recreation; Major visitor accommodation and associated infrastructure; Management systems/ management plan; and 
Educational reform not implemented. Despite advisory board recommendation to keep Galapagos on In Danger List, WHC agrees 
with Ecuadorian government request to remove Galapagos from In Danger List. 
2011  SOC Report noting multiple continued and new threats:  Governance; Identity, social cohesion, changes in local population and 
community; Illegal activities; Impacts of tourism / visitor / recreation; Legal framework; Major visitor accommodation and 
associated infrastructure; Management systems/ management plan; and Educational reform not implemented. 
2012 SOC Report noting multiple continued and new threats:  Identity, social cohesion, changes in local population and community; 
Illegal activities; Impacts of tourism / visitor / recreation; Major visitor accommodation and associated infrastructure; 
Management activities; and Management systems/ management plan. 
2014 SOC Report notes the same threats as 2012. 
2016 SOC Report noting multiple continued and new threats:  Fishing/collecting aquatic resources; Governance; Identity, social 
cohesion, changes in local population and community; Illegal activities; Impacts of tourism / visitor / recreation; Invasive/alien 
terrestrial species; Legal framework; and Major visitor accommodation and associated infrastructure. 




2018  SOC Report notes the same threats as in 2016 (including ‘governance’ as a threat) and reiterates the 2017 Mission Report 
statement that some promises related to remove Galapagos from In Danger List in 2010 have not yet been met. 
2019  WHC commits US$ 59,975 towards usage control and monitoring for the conservation and management of pelagic ecosystems. 
 
              Appropriation: Everglades National Park, USA 
1979 Inscription on WH list. 
1989  SOC Report noting multiple threats: Crop production; Housing; and Industrial areas. 
1992  SOC Report noting the same threats as in 1989 with the addition of storms. 
1993  SOC Report, WHC and US Government (under Clinton administration) agree that adding  the Everglades to the In Danger List 
would assist in dealing with the number of agencies at various levels of government and bring an international and global 
dimension to the conservation of the Everglades. 
1994  SOC Report noting the same threats as in 1992 with the addition of Surface water pollution and Water infrastructure. 
1995  SOC Report noting the same threats as in 1994. 
1996 SOC Report noting the same threats again. 
1997 SOC Report noting the same threats again. 
1998 SOC Report noting the same threats again. 
1999 SOC Report and Mission Report. 
2000 SOC Report noting the same threats again. 
2001 SOC Report noting the same threats again. 
2002 SOC Report noting the same threats again, excepting Storms and with the addition of Management systems/ management plan. 
2003 SOC Report noting the same threats as in 2002. 
2004 SOC Report noting multiple continued and new threats: Ground water pollution; Housing; Management activities; Surface water 
pollution; Water infrastructure; and Concerns about numbers of boaters in Florida Bay and their impacts on bottomland 
wilderness, including propeller scars from boat groundings. 
2005 SOC Report notes same threats to 2004, excepting Management activities and Concerns about numbers of boaters and their 
impacts. 
2006 SOC Report notes same threats to 2005, with the additional re-inclusion of Storms and Management activities.  
2007  SOC Report, despite advisory board recommendation to keep Everglades on List, WHC agrees with last minute US request to 
remove from In Danger List (under Bush administration). Decision criticised by other stakeholders for lack of consultation.  
2008  SOC Report notes same threats to 2006, but with removal of Management activities and the addition of Mercury contamination 
of fish and wildlife. 
2009  Environmental advocacy groups mobilise petition to WHC proposing to relist Everglades as “In Danger” at June WHC meeting in 
Seville, Spain. 
2010  SOC Report, US report to the WHC on the state of conservation of the Florida Everglades requests re-inscription on the List of 
World Heritage in Danger (WHC-SOC-492) (under Obama administration). 
2011 SOC Report noting multiple continued and new threats: Ground water pollution; Land conversion; Management activities; 
Pollution of marine waters; Storms; Surface water pollution; and Mercury contamination of fish and wildlife. 
2012 SOC Report notes same threats to 2011, but with removal of Land conversion and Pollution of marine waters and the addition of 
Housing and Water infrastructure.  
2013 SOC Report and Periodic Reporting 
2014 SOC Report notes same threats to 2012, but with addition of Invasive / alien freshwater species. 
2015 SOC Report notes same threats as 2014. 
2016 SOC Report notes same threats as 2015. 
2017 SOC Report notes same threats as 2016 but with removal of Groundwater pollution. 
2018 SOC Report notes same threats as 2017. 
2019 SOC Report notes same threats as 2018. Site remains on In Danger List. 
 
              Rhetorical adoption - Great Barrier Reef, Australia 
1981 Inscription on WH list. 
1985  SOC Report, noting ground transport infrastructure as a threat. 
1986  SOC Report, WHC identifies GBR as of concern. 
1994  SOC Report, noting multiple threats: ground transport infrastructure, major visitor accommodation and associated infrastructure 
and mining. 
1997 SOC Report, WHC notes that ENGOs have requested that the WHC consider inclusion on In Danger List. Process and reasons for 
inclusion opposed by Australian Government. 
1998  SOC Report, noting same threats as 1994. 
1999  SOC Report, noting same threats as 1994 with the addition of management systems/ management plan. 
2000  SOC Report, noting same threats as 1999 with the addition of “need for more effective catchment management in lands  adjacent 
to the Park”. 
2001 SOC Report, noting multiple continued threats: ground transport infrastructure, major visitor accommodation and associated 
infrastructure, management systems/ management plan, and mining. 
2003  Periodic Reporting. 
2004  SOC Report, noting continuing (major visitor accommodation and associated infrastructure) and new threats (commercial 
development, housing, marine transport infrastructure) 
2005  ENGOs petition WHC seeking to have the Great Barrier Reef (Australia) and other climate-affected sites considered for List of 
World Heritage in Danger. 
2011 SOC Report, noting multiple continuing and new threats: changes to oceanic waters, ground water pollution, marine transport 
infrastructure, non-renewable energy facilities, other climate change impacts, storms, surface water pollution, and temperature 
change. 
2012 SOC Report and Mission Report, WHC considers the possible inscription of the GBR on the List of World Heritage in Danger in the 
absence of substantial progress on controlling proposed coastal development. 
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2013  SOC Report, WHC reiterates 2012 decision to consider the possible inscription of the GBR on the List of World Heritage in Danger. 
2014 SOC Report, WHC reiterates 2013 decision to consider the possible inscription of the GBR on the List of World Heritage in Danger. 
Australian government disputes. 
2015 SOC Report, Australian government avoids potential In Danger Listing by agreeing to develop a long-term sustainability plan. 
2017  SOC Report, noting the same threats as 2011, with the addition of “grounding of ships”.  
2019  Australian national audit and Senate inquiry finds significant portion of finance for long-term GBR Plan deliberately delivered in a 
non-compliant process to a low capacity private organization, thereby jeopardizing ability to achieve key actions and outcomes of 
plan. Australian government also lobbies WHC to prevent climate impacts being used as the basis for an In Danger listing. Site 
remains off In Danger List (despite multiple proposals for In Danger listing, clear rising threats, and a Threat Intensity value equal 
or higher to the lowest Threat Intensity value of the In danger sites.) 
 
             Passive Resistance - Ha Long Bay, Vietnam 
1994  Inscription on WH list. 
1995 SOC Report notes major visitor accommodation and associated infrastructure and marine transport infrastructure as threats. 
1996 SOC Report and Financial Assistance. Concerns over proposed port development and large floating hotel. WHC commits USD 
$24,250 towards sustainable tourism management planning and staff training. 
1997 SOC Report and Financial Assistance. Concerns over enforcement of environmental regulation along the coastal zone. WHC 
commits USD $20,000 towards purchase of management equipment. 
1998 SOC Report, Mission Report and Financial Assistance. WHC commits USD $8,857 for geomorphology study as part of the 
Environmental Impact Assessment underway for proposed port and bridge development. World Bank oversees Mission Report on 
options for comprehensive development of area, including augmented lending in accordance with the Bank’s Country Assistance 
Strategy. World Bank (Vietnamese Office) takes over co-ordination of development and conservation activities in World Heritage 
Area. 
1999 SOC Report notes continuing (marine transport infrastructure) and new threats (impacts of tourism / visitor / recreation). 
2000 SOC Report, Mission Report and Financial Assistance. Concerns over capacity to manage cumulative impacts of multiple 
development projects. WHC commits USD $14,508 for management capacity strengthening workshop. IUCN Mission Report 
notes improved management but significant challenges remain including over-fishing, solid and organic waste, and need for 
effective regional planning. 
2001 SOC Report notes continued and new threats: ground transport infrastructure; impacts of tourism / visitor / recreation; 
management systems/ management plan; marine transport infrastructure; and rapid economic development. 
2002 SOC Report notes same threats as 2001. 
2003 SOC Report and Periodic Report. 
2004 SOC Report notes continued and new threats: financial resources; housing; human resources; identity, social cohesion, changes in 
local population and community; illegal activities; impacts of tourism / visitor / recreation; management systems/ management 
plan; mining; and oil and gas. 
2006 SOC Report notes continued and new threats: financial resources; housing; human resources; identity, social cohesion, changes in 
local population and community; impacts of tourism / visitor / recreation; industrial areas; major visitor accommodation and 
associated infrastructure; and management systems/ management plan. 
2007 SOC Report and Financial Assistance. Concerns over growing urban, industrial and tourism development pressures and lack of an 
integrated planning approach. WHC commits USD 65780 towards institutional strengthening project plus USD619000 extra-
budgetary funds for cultural preservation. 
2009 SOC Report notes same threats as 2006, excluding “impacts of tourism / visitor / recreation”. 
2011 SOC Report notes continued threats: financial resources; housing; identity, social cohesion, changes in local population and 
community; impacts of tourism / visitor / recreation; industrial areas; major visitor accommodation and associated infrastructure; 
and management systems/ management plan. 
2013 SOC Report, IUCN Reactive Monitoring Mission Report recommends that Vietnam government strengthen administrative 
capability of management authority by allowing it a greater degree of independence, authority, and decision-making power in 
conducting its day-to-day management and enforcement roles and responsibilities. 
2014 SOC Report, WHC commends progress but reiterates IUCN recommendation above and encourages State Party to increase 
contribution of tourism revenue to management authority, with progress report due 2016 
2018 Financial Assistance. WHC commits USD $29,750 for management effectiveness evaluation. 
2019 Site remains off In Danger list (and has never even been proposed for In Danger listing) despite clear rising threats and a Threat 
Intensity value equal or higher to the lowest Threat Intensity value of the In danger sites. 
 
 
Supplementary Table S1. Process-tracing of different types of national responses to UNESCO intervention 








Type of Response 
 
 
Site Name (Country) 
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Aldabra Atoll (Seychelles) 
Alejandro de Humboldt National Park (Cuba) 
Ancient Maya City and Protected Tropical Forests of Calakmul, Campeche (Mexico) 
Area de Conservación Guanacaste (Costa Rica) 
Australian Fossil Mammal Sites (Riversleigh / Naracoorte) (Australia) 
Bwindi Impenetrable National Park (Uganda) 
Canadian Rocky Mountain Parks (Canada) 
Canaima National Park (Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)) 
Cape Floral Region Protected Areas (South Africa) 
Cerrado Protected Areas: Chapada dos Veadeiros and Emas National Parks (Brazil) 
Cliff of Bandiagara (Land of the Dogons) (Mali) 
Cocos Island National Park (Costa Rica) 
Dinosaur Provincial Park (Canada) 
Dorset and East Devon Coast (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) 
Fraser Island (Australia) 
Garajonay National Park (Spain) 
Giant's Causeway and Causeway Coast (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) 
Gondwana Rainforests of Australia (Australia) 
Göreme National Park and the Rock Sites of Cappadocia (Turkey) 
Gough and Inaccessible Islands (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) 
Grand Canyon National Park (United States of America) 
Great Smoky Mountains National Park (United States of America) 
Greater Blue Mountains Area (Australia) 
Gros Morne National Park (Canada) 
Gulf of Porto: Calanche of Piana, Gulf of Girolata, Scandola Reserve (France) 
Gunung Mulu National Park (Malaysia) 
Hawaii Volcanoes National Park (United States of America) 
Heard and McDonald Islands (Australia) 
Hierapolis-Pamukkale (Turkey) 
Huanglong Scenic and Historic Interest Area (China) 
Huascarán National Park (Peru) 
Ibiza, Biodiversity and Culture (Spain) 
Ilulissat Icefjord (Denmark) 
iSimangaliso Wetland Park (South Africa) 
Islands and Protected Areas of the Gulf of California (Mexico) 
Jiuzhaigou Valley Scenic and Historic Interest Area (China) 
Kaziranga National Park (India) 
Lake Malawi National Park (Malawi) 
Lake Turkana National Parks (Kenya) 
Laurisilva of Madeira (Portugal) 
Los Glaciares National Park (Argentina) 
Macquarie Island (Australia) 
Mammoth Cave National Park (United States of America) 
Mana Pools National Park, Sapi and Chewore Safari Areas (Zimbabwe) 
Manú National Park (Peru) 
Miguasha National Park (Canada) 
Morne Trois Pitons National Park (Dominica) 
Mount Emei Scenic Area, including Leshan Giant Buddha Scenic Area (China) 
Mount Huangshan (China) 
Mount Taishan (China) 
Nahanni National Park (Canada) 
Nanda Devi and Valley of Flowers National Parks   (India) 
Natural and Cultural Heritage of the Ohrid region (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) 
Natural System of Wrangel Island Reserve (Russian Federation) 
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Noel Kempff Mercado National Park (Bolivia (Plurinational State of)) 
Olympic National Park (United States of America) 
Phong Nha – Ke Bang National Park (Viet Nam) 
Puerto-Princesa Subterranean River National Park (Philippines) 
Purnululu National Park (Australia) 
Redwood National and State Parks (United States of America) 
Río Abiseo National Park (Peru) 
Shark Bay, Western Australia (Australia) 
Shirakami-Sanchi (Japan) 
Shiretoko (Japan) 
Sian Ka'an (Mexico) 
Sichuan Giant Panda Sanctuaries - Wolong, Mt Siguniang and Jiajin Mountains  (China) 
Sinharaja Forest Reserve (Sri Lanka) 
Škocjan Caves (Slovenia) 
St Kilda (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) 
Sundarbans National Park (India) 
Te Wahipounamu – South West New Zealand (New Zealand) 
Thungyai-Huai Kha Khaeng Wildlife Sanctuaries (Thailand) 
Tikal National Park (Guatemala) 
Tongariro National Park (New Zealand) 
Tsingy de Bemaraha Strict Nature Reserve (Madagascar) 
Uluru-Kata Tjuta National Park (Australia) 
Vredefort Dome (South Africa) 
W National Park of Niger (Niger) 
Wadi Al-Hitan (Whale Valley) (Egypt) 
Wet Tropics of Queensland (Australia) 
Willandra Lakes Region (Australia) 
Wulingyuan Scenic and Historic Interest Area (China) 







and extra UNESCO 
assistance required 






Air and Ténéré Natural Reserves (Niger) 
Belize Barrier Reef Reserve System (Belize) 
Comoé National Park (Côte d'Ivoire) 
Djoudj National Bird Sanctuary (Senegal) 
East Rennell (Solomon Islands) 
Galápagos Islands (Ecuador) 
Garamba National Park (Democratic Republic of the Congo) 
Ichkeul National Park (Tunisia) 
Kahuzi-Biega National Park (Democratic Republic of the Congo) 
Los Katíos National Park (Colombia) 
Manas Wildlife Sanctuary (India) 
Manovo-Gounda St Floris National Park (Central African Republic) 
Ngorongoro Conservation Area (United Republic of Tanzania) 
Niokolo-Koba National Park (Senegal) 
Okapi Wildlife Reserve (Democratic Republic of the Congo) 
Plitvice Lakes National Park (Croatia) 
Río Plátano Biosphere Reserve (Honduras) 
Rwenzori Mountains National Park (Uganda) 
Salonga National Park (Democratic Republic of the Congo) 
Sangay National Park (Ecuador) 
Selous Game Reserve (United Republic of Tanzania) 
Simien National Park (Ethiopia) 
Srebarna Nature Reserve (Bulgaria) 
Tropical Rainforest Heritage of Sumatra (Indonesia) 








Supplementary SI References 
 
Appropriation 








Everglades National Park (United States of America) 






Danger, repeated In 
Danger proposals 
but site remains off 
In Danger list, 








Chitwan National Park (Nepal) 
Coiba National Park and its Special Zone of Marine Protection (Panama) 
Dja Faunal Reserve (Cameroon) 
Doñana National Park (Spain) 
Dong Phayayen-Khao Yai Forest Complex (Thailand) 
Durmitor National Park (Montenegro) 
Golden Mountains of Altai (Russian Federation) 
Great Barrier Reef (Australia) 
Historic Sanctuary of Machu Picchu (Peru) 
Isole Eolie (Aeolian Islands) (Italy) 
Kakadu National Park (Australia) 
Keoladeo National Park (India) 
Lake Baikal (Russian Federation) 
Lorentz National Park (Indonesia) 
Mount Kenya National Park/Natural Forest (Kenya) 
Pirin National Park (Bulgaria) 
Pitons Management Area (Saint Lucia) 
Sagarmatha National Park (Nepal) 
Serengeti National Park (United Republic of Tanzania) 
Taï National Park (Côte d'Ivoire) 
Tasmanian Wilderness (Australia) 
The Sundarbans (Bangladesh) 
Three Parallel Rivers of Yunnan Protected Areas (China) 
Virgin Komi Forests (Russian Federation) 
Volcanoes of Kamchatka (Russian Federation) 
Western Caucasus (Russian Federation) 
Whale Sanctuary of El Vizcaino (Mexico) 







certified In Danger 
levels) but with no 
or only one In 
Danger proposal, 
low visibility to 
UNESCO or 





Banc d'Arguin National Park (Mauritania) 
Danube Delta (Romania) 
Ha Long Bay (Viet Nam) 
Henderson Island (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) 
Komodo National Park (Indonesia) 
Mount Athos (Greece) 
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